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Religion and the Constitution: "Eternal
Hostility Against Every Form of
Tyranny Over the Mind of Man"*
Philip B. Kurland**

We are here to pay homage to Ed Barrett. A lecture in constitutional
law may seem to you, as it does to me, a strange way to do so. I do not
mean that a lectureship in his name is not appropriate. I mean that
subjecting him to a sermon on the subject of constitutional law, a sermon which will probably make him squirm if it does not put him to
sleep, is not the best way to express the affection and admiration that
we all feel for him. Ed's casebook in constitutional law has long been
one of the standards in the field. His writings on the subject have untied many of the knots that the Supreme Court has contrived and that
most of us seek to cut rather than to unravel. In a world full of constitutional deconstructionists, his has been a voice of reason. He belongs to
no cult, he is committed to no ideology, and he dares to speak plainly
when few are plainspoken lest their want of ideas be made apparent.
He understands that law is meant to be in the service of society and not
its master.
But we are not here to eulogize Ed Barrett: he is one of the few
persons who would not enjoy it. Indeed, I think he is extraordinary as
a person of great accomplishment who is also modest. In the contemporary world of the law, achievement is seldom coupled with humility.
In this year of the Constitution's bicentennial, we are busily engaged
in celebrating the Founding Fathers. It is most appropriate that we pay
tribute to the Founding Father of this law school. Like the men of
Philadelphia of 1787, Ed undertook to meet an impossible challenge.
He built from scratch a law school of the first order, a law school of
which its university, alumni, students, faculty, and, indeed, the whole
legal profession can be proud. In a few short years, he made U.C. Da* This Article is adopted from the first annual Edward L. Barrett Lecture delivered
at the King Hall School of Law, University of California, at Davis, on March 19,
1987.
** William R. Kenan, Jr. Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago.
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vis School of Law a national law school of premier rank. No, he did
not create this institution without help. He was, however, a necessary if
not a sufficient cause.
I am deeply honored to have been chosen to inaugurate the Edward
Barrett Lectures. I shall try to prove myself worthy by at least avoiding, to the extent I can, the trite and the trivial. I shall try to earn my
welcome by being brief - comparatively brief. Since I shall be concentrating on the meaning to be given to the establishment clause of the
first amendment to the Constitution, however, I cannot as readily avoid
being controversial. The subject is one that evokes more heat than light
in both lector and auditor. I shall endeavor to treat the subject objectively, abiding by Learned Hand's admonition that a scholar's gown is
not an advocate's robe. Hand once wrote:
You may take Martin Luther or Erasmus for your model, but you cannot
play both roles at once; you may not carry a sword beneath a scholar's
gown, or lead flaming causes from a cloister. Luther cannot be domesticated in a university .

. .

. I am satisfied that a scholar who tries to

combine these parts sells his birthright for a mess of pottage ....

I

My quest this evening is for some light on the origins of the establishment clause. It begins, however, with a contemporary controversy.
During the 1984 Term, the Supreme Court handed down several opinions in which it purported to apply the provisions of the establishment
clause.' These decisions evoked a great deal of extraordinarily adverse
commentary.' The commentary was extraordinary not because it was
adverse. Rather, it was unusual because it complained essentially that
the Court had followed its own precedents. The argument was made
that the Court should have abandoned earlier readings of the first
amendment in favor of what the critics labeled the "original" meaning
of the amendment. 4 The critics purported to know what the original
intent of the Framers was. In sum, however, what they sought was to
have the Court indulge the state and national governments affording
aid to religious activities, so long as that aid was not in favor of a
particular church or sect.
I do not mean here to argue the issue whether the only proper way
L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 138 (3d ed. 1960).
See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Thornton v. Calder,
472 U.S. 403 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 472 U.S. 91 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38 (1985).
3 See, e.g., Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese before American Bar Association (July 9, 1985).
4 See, e.g., Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese before Federalist Society
Lawyers Division, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 15, 1985).
2
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to ascertain the true meaning of the Constitution is to discover the connotations and denotations of the Framers' words. Indeed, I propose
here to do that myself. But while I concede that historical origins are a
vital part of constitutional construction, they cannot be the exclusive
guides. If we cannot use a dictionary where we need a history, neither
can we separate text from context or substitute desire for memory.
With Professor Paul Freund, I think that the Constitution can be regarded both as Newtonian and Darwinian, both as a structure and an
organism. -'
When we look back at the origins of our Constitution, it becomes
immediately apparent that in at least one respect Attorney General
Meese and his cohorts are correct in their assertions that the original
intent of the first amendment has been abandoned. The first amendment was not originally intended to be a restraint on state governments.
None of the Bill of Rights was. But it is particularly clear that the first
amendment was not. When Madison proposed the amendments to the
Constitution, his proposal for freedom of religion and freedom of press
and speech was written to apply to the states as well as to the central
government. But the First Congress would have none of it. They were
concerned with freedom from oppression by the national government,
and thought they had succeeded in limiting state power through state
constitutions. If we had nothing more than this history to rely on, it
would be clear that the Supreme Court, in applying the first amendment to the states, has exceeded its mandate. But that would ignore the
role of the fourteenth amendment in curtailing the power of the states
and protecting the rights of their citizens. There are several theories for
reading at least some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights - certainly
the first amendment - into the fourteenth. This, however, is too com6
plex a story even to try to synopsize here.
Suffice it to say that it has long been established that the first amendment liberties protected by the fourteenth amendment include those
specified in the first. Let me turn to the meaning that was in the first
amendment's establishment clause insofar as it was to be a restraint on
national authority, and leave the question of extending that meaning to
P. FREUNIt), THE CONSTrIUTION, NEWTONIAN OR DARWINIAN, Department of
Justice Bicentennial Lecture (1976).
6 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51-54 (1947) (Bill of Rights was initially
adopted to protect individuals from federal, not state, government; only Bill of Rights
provisions that were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" became protected from
state interference through the fourteenth amendment (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937))).
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state action to another time.
First, I should quickly dispose of the canard that it is the Supreme
Court which has removed God from the Constitution. That omission
was by action of the Framers and it was not unintentional. The difference between the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence in
this regard is marked. God is mentioned only once in the Constitution
and that is in the attestation clause in which the date is given as "the
Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty seven." 7
This is not to say that the American people at the time of the founding were not a religious people. They were, indeed, a Christian people.
They were primarily a Protestant people, predominantly congregational adherents of John Calvin in the North and episcopalians detached from the Church of England in the South. All religions, even
Christian ones, were not equal de facto or de jure. But when the Founders wrote their charter of government, they did not invoke the authority or blessings of God to justify or condone what they had done. It was
"We, the People" who "ordain[ed] and establish[ed] this Constitution
for the United States of America." '8 Whether it was more or less presumptuous for them to speak in their own name rather than in God's is
a matter on which judgments may differ. But surely the Founders had
had enough of the government at Westminster which purported to rule
by divine mandate and whose chief magistrate since Henry VIII even Elizabeth - was its highest ecclesiastical authority. Indeed, Professor Harvey Mansfield has recently asserted that "Modern constitutionalism began with a defense of the independence of the human soul
The demon of divine right still
against the claim of divine right ....
needs to be exorcised." 9
If Professor Mansfield is right, modern constitutionalism was born
here in America. And it was here, too, that religious freedom was discovered. I do not mean to repeat the ancient myth that the Pilgrims
brought religious freedom with them from England. It is true that they
were escaping from religious persecution. Once here, however, they
were as intolerant of dissenters as their tormentors had been intolerant
of them. Witness their treatment of Anne Hutchinson and Roger
Williams.10
7 U.S. CONST. attest. clause.

8 Id. preamble.
9 Mansfield, Constitutional Government: The Soul of Democracy, THE
TERESr, No. 86, at 84 (Winter 1987).
10

See

PUBLIC IN-

CHARI.S FRANCIS ADAMS, ANT1NOMINIANISM IN THE COLONY OF MASSA-

CHUSE'l-rS BAY

1636-38 (1894).
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The constitutional history of church and state has been different in
the United States from what was known in the countries of almost all
of our forebears. Our European ancestry knew the controversy between
civil and ecclesiastical authority as a contest between sceptre and mitre
for hegemony over the lives and minds of the people within their domains. The blood that was spilled and continues to be spilled throughout the world in these contests for authority were never frequent or
important in the nation that became the United States. That church
and state have seldom, if ever, been locked in battle in this country,
does not mean that persecution of religious minorities has been unknown. Indeed, persecution was prevalent before the framing of the
Constitution and in evidence even after that. Religious bigotry - like
other forms of bigotry - has not been absent from our land even in
modern times. For bigotry is a product of ignorance and superstition
that affects the educated as well as the illiterate. I mean only to suggest
that until now, religious bigotry, unlike racial bigotry, has been the
prerogative of individuals and not a force of government.
It may be that the old world church-state issues did not darken the
new nation for the simple reason that the people of the United States
have not been governed either by crown or church since the revolution.
The Constitution was created by the people and the people are their
own sovereigns. Government is the agent of the people, subject to selfimposed constitutional restraints. The churches are voluntary associations to whom authority is voluntarily surrendered by individuals and
as readily reclaimed by them. The Preamble to the Constitution of
what has been called "The First New Nation"' 1 proclaims the people
as their own masters, beholden as a nation to no rulers, lay or clerical.
As Clinton Rossiter wrote in his book on "The Grand Convention,"
the United States was born in a condition of religious toleration which
was the inheritance of John Locke and which had developed within the
colonies before they became states.
Although the secular culture of the new nation was still in a thinly
productive state - with Noah Webster, David Rittenhouse, Francis Hopkinson, Philip Freneau, Charles Wilson Peale, Jedediah Morse, David
Ramsay, Joel Barlow, Thomas Jefferson, and John Trumbull the "hopeful proofs of genius" - its religion was moving into new ways of believing
and behaving. The Old World pattern of state-church relations had been
hurried toward its doom by the Revolution, the most splendid milestone
being Virginia's (that is to say Jefferson's) Statute of Religious Liberty of
1786; the New World pattern of multiplicity, democracy, private judgment, mutual respect, and widespread indifference was well on its way to

S. L'S:T, THi*

FIRST NEw NATION (1963).
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maturity. Although America was still largely a nation of believers in 1787,
many of the believers - and almost all of them in high political station were thoroughly tolerant of the beliefs of others. Neither upper-class ritualism nor lower-class enthusiasm had much appeal for the solid citizens of
the United States, and men who still claimed to enjoy a monopoly of
religious truth were no longer in a position to impose their dogmas on
dissenting neighbors.' 2

What must be remarked about the famous Act for Establishing
Religious Freedom 3 is that it revealed that for Jefferson and Madison,
church disestablishment was an intrinsic part of and not distinct from
their notion of religious liberty. Concededly, the ideas of religious tolerance which had informed almost all of the laws of the original states
were not always as generous as the principles they purported to espouse. Some of the state constitutions were prepared to tolerate only
Protestants, some only Trinitarians, some only monotheists; some excluded Catholics or Quakers or Baptist in terms. But the closer they
came to the founding of the new nation, the closer they came to a more
universal tolerance. Jefferson's statute and then the first amendment
took the great leap never taken elsewhere - not yet in England, not
yet in Europe - from full religious tolerance to complete religious liberty. As Tom Paine wrote in his Rights of Man: "Toleration is not the
opposite of intolerance, but is the counterfeit of it. Both are despotisms.
The one assumes to itself the right of withholding Liberty of Conscience, and the other of granting it."'

4

Tench Coxe stated the

abandonmnent of toleration with more particularity:
The situation of religious rights in the American states, though also well
known, is too important, too precious a circumstance to be omitted. Almost
every sect and form of Christianity is known here - as also the Hebrew
church. None are tolerated. All are admitted, aided by mutual charity and
concord, and supported and cherished by the laws. In this land of promise
for the good men of all denominations, are actually to be found, the independent or congregational church from England, the protestant episcopal
church (separated by our revolution from the church of England)[,] the
quaker church, the English, Scotch, Irish and Dutch presbyterian or calvinist churches, the Roman catholic church, the German Lutheran church,
the German reformed church, the baptist and anabaptist churches, the
hugonot or French protestant church, the Moravian church, the Swedish
episcopal church, . . . the menonist church, with other christian sects, and
the Hebrew church. Mere toleration is a doctrine exploded by our general
C. RossrinER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 35-36 (1966) (footnote omitted).
8 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 399 (W.T. Hutchinson, et al., eds. 1973) [hereafMADISON PAPERS], reprinted in 5 P. KURI.AND & R. LERNER, THE FOUNDERS'

12
'3

ter

CONSTIrUTION

T4
T. PAINE,

84 (1987).
RIGHTS OF MAN

65 (1971).

HeinOnline -- 20 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 710 1986-1987

19871

Religion

condition; instead of which have been substituted unqualified admission,
and assertion, "that their own modes of worship and of faith equally belong to all the worshippers of God, of whatever church, sect, or
'5
denomination."'

With the provisions for disestablishment in the Virginia Statute of
Religious Freedom, the concept of religious freedom came to full fruition. Not only was the state barred from imposing sanctions on dissenters, it was precluded as well from rewarding the faithful. Billy clubs
and bribes were equally banished. The statute sought to remove government from the business of religion and religion from the business of
government.
It is often argued these days that the concept of establishment means
only the designation of a particular church or churches as the official
ones which can receive governmental aid. It is thought to follow from
this premise that the establishment clause forbids only this kind of preferential government action. The argument is faulty both in premise and
conclusion. Establishment was not monolithic in nature. The establishment clause did not inhibit only the creation or recognition of an official church. We must remember that the establishment clause bans any
"law respecting an establishment of religion,"' 16 not only those actually
endorsing a religion.
The principal facets of establishment are at least three. First, with
establishment, government participated in the control of the church and
the church in control of the government. In England, for example, the
government determines by law the proper content of the religion: the
Book of Common Prayer is government ordained as are the Thirty
Nine Articles. The government decides who shall hold high ecclesiastical office, with the Queen the sworn protector of the faith. The government even allots the livings of the ministry. The Bishops sat and sit in
the House of Lords by reason of their ecclesiastical offices. In New
England, there was no church hierarchy to be appointed, and the order
of service was pretty well left to the local ministry, who were chosen by
local government. In the South, where the Church of England prevailed, the Anglican Bishops exercised the better part of valor by remaining in England and ordaining the American clergy from there.
The first prong of an established church, government control of the
administration of the church and its services, or participation by the
church in the affairs of government was not a formal reality in the
'- T. COx-, No'r.s CONC:RNING THE UNITED S'rAE.S OF AMERICA (1970), reprinted in 5 P. KUR.AND & R. LERNER, supra note 13, at 94.
16 U.S. CONs'r. amend. I.
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American states at the time of the framing of the American Constitution except perhaps in the choice of the standard version of the Bible.
A second prong of establishment was the requirement that lasted
well into the nineteenth century in England and in many American
states. This requirement was that all members of the Government, as
well as beneficiaries of other forms of government largesse such as
membership in Universities, subscribe to the religious doctrines of the
established church. In most American states, even those where the constitutions made provisions for toleration, test oaths were the rule rather
than the exception. Virginia and Rhode Island were exceptions.
The third major element of establishment was support of a designated church or designated churches through the taxing power and by
other forms of governmental imprimatur of church behavior and privileges. This, too, was standard operating procedure in most of the states.
Indeed, compelled payment of taxes for the purpose of supporting the
ministry - one's own or another's - was the particular evil at which
Jefferson's statute was aimed.
Jefferson's Statute for Religious Freedom 7 was revolutionary in its
abolition of all three attributes of establishment. The statute regarded
the requirement of disestablishment as necessary to complete the right
of religious freedom. It is appropriate in light of the many calumnies
that have been visited upon those who defend the notion of separation
of church and state to iterate that Jefferson's statute was not a denial of
God. The statute indeed invoked God as its source for the positions it
would legislate. Jefferson was a deist, not an atheist or agnostic.
Madison was a fully committed member of the Christian sect to which
he belonged. I could, perhaps, make the point of this talk best by simply reading to you the full text of the Statute. But you can do that
better yourselves. The statute is short and its rhetoric is more cogent
than any reading by me could make it. I should insist here only that it
clearly condemns all three attributes of establishment as well as commanding complete toleration of all forms of religion.
I think that it is safe to say that, with occasional backsliding, our
constitutional history has reflected a growing acceptance and adherence
to the principles of toleration and separation as set forth in Jefferson's
Statute. Before I leave the Statute, however, I would remind you that,
although Jefferson was the author of the statute, which he wrote in
1779, he was in Europe as an emissary of the Continental Congress in
1786 when James Madison secured its enactment in the Virginia legis-

17

8

MADISON PAPERS,

supra note 13, at 9.

HeinOnline -- 20 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 712 1986-1987

Religion

19871

lature.18 Madison had paved the way for its enactment by his opposition to Patrick Henry's bill for religious assessment, and through the
enormous public support that he evoked by his "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessment," 1 9 which must be read as part of
the legislative history of the 1786 statute. The tie of the 1786 statute to
Madison is not unimportant in light of Madison's great responsibility
for the contents of the text of the 1787 Constitution and the First
Amendment itself.
I have suggested that the first aspect of separation, control of the
liturgy and the clergy by the government, has never been an important
element in American church-state relations. The 1787 Constitution itself effectively removed the second aspect of separation, disqualification
from office for failure to subscribe to the tenets of a state-sanctioned
religion. It is too often ignored that Article Six of the Constitution provides: "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to
' 20
any Office or Public Trust under the United States.
Oliver Ellsworth, John Marshall's immediate predecessor as Chief
Justice of the United States, writing in 1787 as The Landholder in
defense of this provision of the Constitution, also saw this aspect of
separation as but a part of religious liberty, not as a separate concept of
disestablishment. He wrote about this provision of Article VI:
Some very worthy persons, who have not had great advantages for information, have objected against that clause . . . . They have been afraid
that the clause is unfavorable to religion. But my countrymen, the sole
purpose and effect of it is to exclude persecution, and to secure to you the
important right of religious liberty. We are almost the only people in the
world, who have a full enjoyment of this important right of human nature.
In our country every man has a right to worship God in that way which is
most agreeable to his conscience. If he is a good and peaceable person he is
liable to no penalties or incapacities on account of his religious sentiments;
or in other words, he is no[t] subject to persecution. .

.

. Test-laws are

useless and ineffectual, unjust and tyrannical; therefore the Convention
have done wisely in excluding this engine of persecution, and providing
2
that no religious test shall ever be required. '

When we come to the 1789 provisions of the first amendment relating
to religion we again find nothing strange or incompatible with the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. Indeed, if the amendment is read
Is Id.
19Id. at 298.
20 U.S. CONS.

art. VI.

Ellsworth, A Landholder VII, Connecticut Courant, Dec. 17, 1787, reprinted in
4 P. KURILAND & R. LERNER, supra note 13, at 639, 641.
2
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with the Virginia statute in mind - and it should be remembered that
it is Madison's handiwork - there would be little need for construction. It provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 2 2 Certainly
the phrase "shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion"
suggests some broader restraint than "shall make no law establishing a
national church."
In any event, the constitutional mandates relating to religion remained all but moribund during most of our history, acting more as
counsels of moderation than as rules of decision. Establishment issues
tested state courts under their own constitutions, particularly as the
Catholic Church more or less successfully fought against compulsory
prayer and Bible reading in the public schools. But, the early treatment
of Mormons aside, the national government was seldom seen to be
guilty of interfering with religious activities. Special beneficient treatment for clerics and religious activities which took - and takes many and varied forms, including railroad passes, tax exemptions, and
exemption from immigration quotas, were held immune from judicial
attack. This was largely because national citizens were held to have no
right to challenge governmental expenditures in court, even when the
expenditures furthered religious interests. And the first amendment,
like all of the Bill of Rights, was originally regarded as confining only
the national and not the state governments.
The middle of the twentieth century, however, brought about revolutionary changes in constitutional doctrine. Not only was it discovered
that national taxpayers had a constitutional right to challenge governmental expenditures that funded religious activities, it was also revealed
-

and the process was certainly akin to revelation -

that the provi-

sions of the sixth article and the first amendment were equally applicable to the states as well as the nation by reason of their inclusion in the
fourteenth amendment. Once the question of state behavior became justiciable, the Court announced the applicable standards in Jeffersonian
terms. The language of Mr. Justice Black in the Everson case in 1947
was, in very large measure, a modern paraphrase of the terms of the
Virginia statute of 1786. Black wrote in Everson:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means

at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person
to go or to remain away from church against his will or force him to
"

22 U.S. CONSEI.

amend. 1.
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profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendante or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
23

versa.

It is obvious that for Mr. Justice Black, too, the distinction between
freedom of religion and nonestablishment was, at best, a diaphanous
line.
For the most part, the Court has adhered to the principles announced in Everson. Unfortunately, however, in the four decades since
Everson, the Court has sought to improve on Black's language by offering new and different rationalizations, frequently tailored to the facts of
the case before it and cut on a bias to achieve a result. Sophistry has
frequently supplanted reason and principle, as the Court has sought to
maintain a neutrality between church and state, first on the one side
and then on the other. (I am reminded here of an introduction by
Thomas Reed Powell of Harlan Fiske Stone at a Columbia Law Review dinner, where Powell said that Stone was "neither partial, on the
one hand, nor impartial, on the other.") The result has been an accumulation of precedents in the field that are often at odds with one
another. The Court, in an effort to justify itself to the highly emotional
contesting elements in the society, has been able to satisfy no one.
Those who write the opinions, like those who attack or defend them,
seem frequently engaged in furthering their personal predilections
rather than advancing constitutional standards.
Calls for reversal of one judgment or another by constitutional
amendment are frequently heard in the land, like the voice of the turtle.
But those who do so learn that there is no consensus, certainly not the
required extraordinary legislative pluralities needed to effect change by
this means. A counsel of patience suggests that the protagonists of governmental support for religion would do best simply to await a change
of personnel on the Court. For it is apparent that the political forces of
the anti-Jeffersonians, the contemporary George Babbits and Elmer
Gantrys, are gaining political strength as the fundamentalist churches
join some of the old-line churches as the most potent Political Action
Committees in the nation.
It is to be realized that as the religious differences among American

23

Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
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religions and sects continue to diminish, the prime protection for individual religious freedom on which Madison relied, multiplicity of
religious organizations, is disappearing. This will necessarily mean that
absent the protections of the Constitution, majority rule will destroy
minority rights. And we shall be returned to that state of persecution
which the Virginia Statute of 1786, the Constitution of 1787, and the
first amendment of 1791 attempted to end. Madison's language in the
FederalistNumber Fifty-One reveals his concern and his notion of the
means for protecting against majority tyranny:
Whilst all authority . . . will be derived from and dependent on the soci-

ety, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and
classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be
in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free
government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and
in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both
24
cases will depend on the number of interests and sects ....

It is probably futile to suggest to those who look to government to
finance and to sponsor their religious activities and beliefs to consider
some wisdom of Benjamin Franklin:
When a Religion is good, I conceive that it will support itself; and when it
cannot support itself, and God does not take care to support it, so that its
Professors are oblig'd to call for the help of the Civil Power, it is a sign, I
25
apprehend, of its being a bad one.

And then there are the counsels of Roger Williams who, even before
Jefferson and Madison, called for a total separation of church and
state. 26 He reminded us in effect that "he who pays the piper calls the
tune." Religion underwritten by the funds or force of the state is likely
to become a captive of the state. The history of Freedom where religion
is a tool of the state or where the state is a tool of religion is usually a
very short history indeed.
It is probably as impertinent for a law professor to try to teach the
Supreme Court its business as it once was for a youngster to try to
teach his grandmother how to suck eggs. Not only impertinent but futile. And so I tell you what I cannot tell the Justices. I think that most
of their problems in the so-called "establishment clause" cases derive
from the fact that they are not addressing the right questions. And the
right answer is dependent upon the right question. The problem is not,
24

THE FEDE.RAIISr No. 51, at 324 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).

25 Letter from B. Franklin to Richard Price (Oct. 9, 1780).
26 See J. ERNST, THE POI.1TICAI. THOUGHT OF Ro(;.GER WII.I.IAMS (1929);
ERNSI, R(X;ER WILLIAMS, NEw ENGI.AND FIREBRAND (1932).
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as they tend to see it in so many cases, whether government may aid or
support religion, whether by way of subvention or imprimatur. That
question is answered in the negative by the precepts of the Constitution. The issue usually raised by the establishment cases is whether the
government action or inaction is in fact aid to religion. The Court in
Everson was not riven so much over Black's reading of the establishment clause as by his decision that payment for the busing of a single
parochial school student was succor to the church. The factual questions are hard ones, for in our complex modern societies, ecclesiastical
institutions, like most institutions, play a multiplicity of roles. A church
school is not only engaged in sectarian education but in meeting the
requirements of secular education imposed by the state and local authorities as well. Even the church itself is frequently as much engaged
in social welfare activities as in saving souls. Only when a public
agency is being used for religious worship or religious training is the
question an easy one.
I do not mean to ring the tocsin. With all due respect to the adversaries, the church-state issues that have roiled the courts and the nation
have not been earth-shaking matters. They are worrisome only for the
same reason that it is desirable to keep the camel's nose outside the
tent. But behind the petty quarrels there is a fundamentally important
principle at stake, which cannot be too often compromised without being lost. What is at venture in the cases denominated church and state
are not the picayune governmental expenditures or religious blasphemies involved in state sponsored religious symbols or school prayers.
What is at issue is nothing less than preserving the freedom of the individual mind. The preservation of that freedom is the reason behind the
first amendment, not only its religion clauses but its speech and press
and petition and assembly provisions as well. And in this area, the
greatest danger lies in the attempts by adults, who have closed their
own minds, to close the minds of others, especially children, through
the instruments of government sanctions. Of course, the young are the
most vulnerable to indoctrination. But the histories of every European
nation, some well into the twentiteth century, and not excluding England, have taught us that it is not only the young who are vulnerable to
the coercion of religious bigotry.
It is the constitutional objective of freedom of the mind that should
inform the construction of the application of the constitutional provisions that come before the Court. Principled decisions, not what Mr.
Justice Schaefer used to call "pots and pans jurisprudence," must be its
guide. Let me remind you of the opening words of Jefferson's statute:
Well aware that the opinions and belief of men depend not on their
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own will, but follow involuntarily the evidence proposed to their minds,
that Almighty God hath created the mind free, and manifested his Supreme will that free it shall remain, by making it altogether insusceptible
of restraint: That all attempts to influence it by temporal punishment or
burthens, or by civil incapacities, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy
and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the holy author of our
religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as was his Almighty power to do, but to
extend it by its influence on reason alone .... 21

In the Second Flag Salute Case, Mr. Justice Jackson spoke in less majestic language when he said: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
28
therein."
In the cenotaph for Jefferson, located close to the Lincoln Memorial
and at the other end of the Ellipse from the Washington monument,
there is emblazoned on the walls a proposition that distills the essence
of the Jeffersonian philosophy and encapsulates the first amendment.
The words are these: "I have sworn upon the altar of God eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man."

21 8 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 13, at 9.
28 Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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